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Clark: Methods of Legal Reform

METHODS OF LEGAL REFORM
CHAPMES E. CLAaK
My predecessor, Dean Hutchins, visited your charming state
last year before his translation to the Olympian heights of a college presidency on the occasion of Dr. Turner's inauguration as
head of your state University. He brought back such glowing
tales of your kindness and hospitality and of your interest in
legal research and law reform that I could not resist your invitation to be here today. But, like him, I find myself at a loss
as to what I may tell you or how I may presume to instruct you.
You are doing so well so many worthwhile things that a visitor
can only look upon you with awe not unmixed with envy. I
must content myself therefore with a statement of my warm approval of your program and with some few suggestions regarding it. I am the more emboldened to do this because your work,
admirable as it is, may after all be considered in the nature of
promise, with fulfillment indeed forecast but not absolutely guaranteed.
My remarks will concern chiefly the Report of the faculty of
the College of Law of West Virginia University, Submitting Suggestions Concerning Pleading and Practice in West Virginia,
which has just been placed before you. I congratulate its authors
for producing so fine a document. I congratulate you for making
it possible. 'Later I shall refer to some of its more important
points. But I am especially concerned, as I trust you all are,
with considering means to cause it to be accepted as the official
act of your state. Even in this forward looking part of the
world it seems that legislative bodies run true to type. Your Association reports disclose the dire fact that the West Virginia
Legislature has not looked with favor upon your previous proposals. In 1926 one of your distinguished members, Judge MeClintic, said that when the name of the Bar Association is used
in connection with a bill that kills it in the Legislature every
time. Judge Robinson aptly replied that this condemned the
Legislature, not the Association. The apparent conclusion was
that nothing could be done and that the reform proposals should
merely be laid before the Legislature to be taken or left, presumably left, by it. I am reminded of a similar post mortem
held by the Connecticut Judicial Council of which I have recently
had the honor to become a member. We were surveying the
wreck of our proposals before the Connecticut Legislature last
*Dean of the School of Law, Yale University.
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spring where almost nothing was salvaged and where the bitterest
blows were delivered by two local bar association committees.
What was to be done about it? Some of us felt that we should
attempt to organize an active campaign for the future. But one
of our best members hung back on the ground that the function
of a council was to offer a program, not to try to force it upon a
reluctant community.
Now this is a natural position for reformers to take. It requires sustained intellectual effort of a high order to organize and
develop a plan of practical judicial reform. One would not devote himself to such a thankless task unless moved by a sense of
public obligation. When such public service is rejected, and rejected often with a scorn which seems to impugn the motives of
those who offer it, dignity opposes a plaintive appeal for support. But no matter how justified such a feeling is, it is one
which wholly fails to view the task of judicial improvement realistically. It may be high minded, but it is unfitted for our actual
legal world. Any program of reform of justice which does not
face the likelihood of an indifferent, if not hostile legislature, and
a bar at least one-third inert and one third openly antagonistic is
not based upon the realities of past experience. When we blithely inaugurate our projects for improving the administration of
justice we hardly realize the long and arduous journey upon
which we have set forth. In England the reform movement began in 1776. It was then that Jeremy Bentham made his famous
attack upon the smugness of Blackstone's Commentaries. Notwithstanding the strenuous efforts of himself and his associates,
no definite results appeared until the adoption of the Hilary Rules
of 1834. Curiously enough these were drafted by a commission
of experts. We may well take warning and be humble when we
consider what that first group of procedural experts did. For
they were dominated by Stephen, author of the famous book on
Common Law Pleading, to whom must always be attributed the
great mistake of picturing that system as simple and logical. For
thus he was able to make the new reform a closer approach to
common law pleading than even the former practice had been. A
generation of the strictest and most technical legal formalism ensued. The spirit of the change is well indicated by a part of Sergeant Hayes' famous dialogue "Crogate's Case". This as you
will recall was a colloquy in the Shades of whom one of the participants was Baron Surrebutter, identified as Baron Parke, later
Lord Wenleysdale, a great judge though over zealous on pleading
technicalities. The other was Crogate, he who gave his name to
the famous case of Coke's time dealing with the nature of the replication de injuria. The baron has been trying without much
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success to convince Crogate of the beauty of the decision against
him in that case. He adverts to the new rules just adopted.
Then Crogate says: "Oh! you've been making new rules about
pleading, have you, then I suppose, as a matter of course, that
you've pretty nearly done away with the whole thing? Surrebutter, B. Done away with special pleading? Heaven forbidl
On the contrary, we adopted it * * * in even more than its original integrity. * * * And we framed a series of rules on the subject, which have given a truly magnificent development to this
admirable system; so much so, indeed, that nearly half the cases
coming recently before the Court, have been decided upon points
of pleading. Crogate. You astonish me. But pray, how do the
suitors like this sort of justice? Surrebutter, B. Mr. Crogate,
that consideration has never occurred to me, nor do I conceive
that laws ought to be adopted to suit the tastes and capacities of
the ignorant."
It took nearly another half-century to undo the results of this
"disastrous mistake" of Stephen and his associates, as the histor ian Holdsworth terms the Hilary reform. There ensued the
long contest which Professor Sunderland has so brilliantly described in his article entitled "The English Struggle for Procedural Reform". Not until 1873 was the final step taken-the
passage of the Judicature Act. The general success of the system then inaugurated was due in large measure to the organization of a rules committee charged with the duty of suggesting
procedural changes as need therefor should arise. The draftsmen of your Report have wisely drawn largely upon the English experience in providing a means of continuing control of
practice. They have thus avoided any danger of making a mistake such as that made by Stephen and his associates. They demonstrate the wisdom, too, of exercising care in selecting your experts, and the advantage of selecting those who will study all
aspects of the subject rather than those committed to one ideal,
of pleading, and that an antiquated one, as was Stephen.
In this country, too, significant examples of the inertia or hostility of the bar to law reform are not wanting. The New York
Code of 1848, the model for the present procedure of over onehalf the states, was, it is true, the work of a lawyer, David Dudley Field. But the opposition of bench and bar to that Code is a
matter of history. Had the courts construed the code system of
practice more in an endeavor to carry out its purpose and less
in an attempt to continue the old formalities, many of its difficulties which now cry out for reform would never have arisen.
A modern example of the same attitude is available in New
York. A few years ago a strong board of judges and lawyers
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was charged by the .Legislature with the duty of recommending a
new practice code. This board after some years of study brought
in a scholarly and workmanlike report recommending a system
based on the English model. But it was rejected. The lawyers
in the New York Assembly consulted their brethren at the bar
and learned that many of its provisions were undesirable or unworkable. -Curiously several of those happened to have been giving satisfaction for many years, not farther away than in the adjoining State of Connecticut. So the Assembly adopted the Civil
Practice Act of 1920, a hybrid combination of the former New
York and present English procedure, where the new was largely offset and nullified by the old. The result has been the confusion
which should have been foreseen. It happens that in 1927, the congestion of business in the courts of New York City forced the Assembly to adopt one of the proposals previously rejected-automatic waiver of trial by jury unless seasonably claimed. An immediate lessening of the congestion followed, stimulated also by
the imposition of a sizable jury fee and by the investigation of
ambulance chasing lawyers.
Another striking example appears in a little book published in
1927 on the Law of Evidence, which gives the results of researches of a committee of the Commonwealth Foundation. One
rule examined by the committee was that concerning the admissibility of evidence of declarations by a deceased in actions by
or against his estate. In New York as it happens the common
law rule is applied and such evidence is rejected. In Massachusetts by statute it is received where the declarations are in
writing and their authenticity is shown to the satisfaction of the
trial judge. In Connecticut under a statute of long standing the
evidence, where relevant, is freely received without restriction.
The committee consulted lawyers from each of these states on the
operations of these quite diverse rules. True to their traditions,
the lawyers in each state pretty generally felt that the only possible workable rule was their own.
How marvellously powerful are those intangible lines which
separate one state from another! Connecticut may be the home
of the wooden nutmeg; but, its people may be trusted with the
sayings of their dead in a way which is not to be conceived of for
those who live on the outer side of its boundaries.
Sometimes the lawyers will oppose reforms which seem clearly
to their own advantage. The Connecticut Judicial Council this
spring urged a bill under which a mild penalty would be imposed
for violation of the rule that answering pleadings must be filed
within 20 days after a case is brought to court. The bill was
fought and defeated by lawyers of the class recognized as plain-
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tiffs' attorneys. Yet the Council was able to show by statistics
compiled for it by the Yale Law School that defendants wero
habitually delaying their answers far beyond the limits set by the
rule and in fact for months. The present practice was therefore
working in favor of delinquent defendants. Can it be that a
plaintiff's lawyer after all has little interest in forcing his case
to trial speedily?
The criticism which I am here making of the rank and file of
the bar-not I hope you will notice of the leaders of the profession-is, I believe, amply merited. No group is more backward in
putting its own house in order. Yet the law is naturally a conservative profession. It bases its rules upon the precedents of the
past. And the air is full of reform notions and panaceas. I
sympathize very much with the point of view of the lawyer who
asks to be shown as to any new proposal to remodel the courts.
Legal reform which is to be effective must come from the student
of the subject not from the mere chance shot of the headlines.
The judicial councils and the law teachers working together must
develop the proposals. The bar associations must see that they
are adopted. Unless the more public spirited members of the bar,
organize in associations, take up the cause of reform in an active,
wholehearted way, it is lost.
-Consequently I am most interested to see what you are going to
do with this Report. Approve it, yes; but as experience has
shown, mere formal endorsement by your Association is not
enough. Unless you can secure a support from the bar as a whole
you can hardly expect legislative approval. With local support
from all parts of your state it is probable that your legislature
will respond. I believe the way to success is by decentralization
of your organization. In Connecticut we are planning to have
local committees appointed by each county bar association to cooperate with the judicial council in suggesting, developing and
supporting projects of judicial reform. I do not know whether
your organization lends itself to the adoption of a similar plan,
but at least the appointment of local committees seems possible.
To be effective, the committees must be carefully selected from
among men willing to put their time and energy to the task.
Such men are, however, available in every city of any size, particularly from among the younger lawyers who have a quite
proper desire to distinguish themselves. The committees should
be expected to do more than register approval of your projects;
they should actually participate in them and make them their
own. Even if your judicial council is organized, it will make its
work more effective by such co-operation with local committees.
Moreover the organization of your bar association will be
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strengthened. One of the strongest associations in this country,
the Federation of Bar Associations of Western New York, is composed entirely of delegates representing local and county organizations. It is true that such a plan will not entirely eliminate
opposition from lawyers. But a nucleus of interested and informed lawyers in each community will go far to offset the inertia
or hostility of the remaining members of the bar.
I hope and trust, therefore, that you will not content yourselves
with merely placing this reform before the Legislature with almost an invitation to have it tossed out of the window; but that
you will seriously and even prayerfully consider ways and means
of making your real influence felt as it deserves to be.
Why should support be given to the particular plan developed
in this Report? Because it is the simplest and yet most effective
possible means to secure constant study and improvement of your
judicial system. It puts into express form plans which have been
developed successfully but extrajudicially elsewhere. The machinery suggested consists of a judicial council which has rule
making power, facilities for research through the use of the faculty of the state law school and data to show what it and the
courts are doing supplied by the bureau of statistics.
The conferring of rule making power upon the Judicial Council is a novel but sensible plan. This places the power where
it is likely to be exercised and exercised rightly. It is now thoroughly recognized that legislative control of procedure, arbitrary,
uninformed, capricious and occasional as it must necessarily be,
is undesirable. But judicial rule making power is all too often
accepted as a final solution of all problems of judicial reform.
The courts are too busy with other things to spend the time and
study necessary to improve their own processes. Experience has
shown that unless the pressure for improvement comes from without, the courts will not exercise the power conferred upon them.
It is not fully realized how constant and continuing should be the
study of the court processes if they are to be kept most effective.
As we have seen, the lawyers who hate change and who have
solved the old procedure to their own satisfaction oppose attempts
at improvement. But it is precisely because they have so well
solved and even circumvented the old system that change is necessary. Procedure is a tool, a means to an end and not an end in
itself. That end is the application of rules of substantive law to
the case in hand. Unless that end be lost sight of, the process to
reach it must be constantly re-examined and subordinated to the
ultimate objective. Here was the final defect of the common law
system. The process became so important that it dwarfed the
product.
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We often think of a law suit as a game of skill. When the process is thus overemphasized, the comparison becomes apt. Our
great athletic contests are brilliant spectacles. The rules are designed to this end, that is, to glorify the process rather than the
result. The public likes the open game in foot-ball and rules are
adopted favoring the forward pass. It likes home runs in baseball and a special resilient ball is manufactured. Recently on the
sporting page of my local paper I was attracted by a headline
which seemed out of place there and to belong with the crime
news. It read "Eddie Elkins robbed at Walnut Beach". It
turned out, however, that the robbery was of a decision in a boxing match in which Eddie was one of the principals and that the
crime was committed by the referee, while "2000 fight fans looked
on aghast". In spite of this miscarriage of justice, a good timo
seems to have been had by all, and another is in anticipation
since by reason of the robbery Eddie was considered entitled to
another go at his opponent. Thus in boxing as in law a misguided decision leads to a return engagement. But a result si
satisfactory in athletics can hardly be regarded with like equanimity when the administration of justice is involved.
A judicial council is necessary, therefore, in order to keep the
machinery of justice bright and clean. Since the rules are finally approved by the court, the constitutionality of the process
seems assured. Even a judicial council, however, is not enough.
The higher the calibre of the Council, the more probable it is
that the members are busy lawyers who can not afford the time
for extensive and onerous research. That must be done by scholars whose main activity it is. You have at hand the body fitted
to the task in the law faculty of your state university. The ability and the enthusiasm is there. It is a practical application of
the policy which Dr. Turner announced upon his inauguration of
placing the facilities of the State University at the service of the
State for the public good. It is wise too that the law faculty be
given official recognition in the membership of the Council for
this is additional insurance that the desired co-operation will obtain. You are indeed fortunate in the high calibre and devotion
of your staff of experts. I hope that you will use them to the
limit of their endurance. Only good can come of such a combination of resources.
We should not assume, however, that the law faculty will receive no benefits from the work commensurate with those it gives.
At Yale where we have done similar research for the Connecticut
Judicial Council we have found it of inestimable value for the
development of our abler students. A superior type of man is
needed for the work, but this we find by a system of selective
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choice of our student personnel and rigid exclusion of the unfit.
The particular research is then treated as honors work, to be done
under faculty supervision but largely on the individual responsibility of the student. No better training in the technique of legal
investigation can be conceived. The development of the student's
own initiative is invaluable for his future career as a lawyer.
The most ambitious report as prepared has been one on the summary judgment. The Judicial Council took this and drafted
rules for summary procedure which have been adopted for the
practice of our state. The draftsmen of your Report have followed these rules to a considerable extent in preparing Section 17
of this Act amending the motion for judgment procedure. Other
matters which we have investigated for our Council include such
topics as appellate procedure, discovery under modern statutes,
comments on failure of the accused to testify, use of expert
testimony as to insanity in criminal cases, pleading special
defenses in criminal cases--the council has lately drafted
and the judges have adopted new rules of criminal pleading-and
the constitutionality of the exercise of the rule making power by
courts. We have had pleasure and satisfaction out of the work,
and the council has said publicly that it was indispensably necessary to them and that our School had performed a distinct public
service to the state in undertaking it.
A sample of the kind of work which you may expect of your
expert staff is contained in their proposed plan for amending the
motion for judgment procedure. You will see that they have
made their suggestions limited, conservative and practical. They
have adopted the ingenious scheme of engrafting upon a simple
and well understood procedure-the motion for judgment-a complete system of civil pleading. This reduces the difficulties of innovation to a minimum. And yet the procedure is so direct that
as in Virginia the lawyers will probably tend to give up resort to
the older and more cumbersome methods.
Noteworthy features of the proposed rules are the simple procedure for raising the issues in a case and the provisions for free
joinder of causes and parties. Although the chief glory of common law pleading was supposed to lie in its effect in forcing the
parties to a single definite issue, the system largely failed of its
object by the very formality of the process. The issue was only
arrived at by successive alternative pleadings, which were unlimited in number. When the issue was finally reached it was
often not the most important or the solely important one. After
all the delay the real sources of controversy might remain unrevealed or only partially revealed. Under code pleading on the
other hand the emphasis was upon stating the facts. A desirable
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plan in theory, in practice it led to the hopeless bog of deciding
what a fact is, and distinguishing it from law and evidence. If
you ask of a man whether he is married, are you asking him for
fact, law or evidence? It is a fact which looms pretty large to
most people still. Yet it must also involve a pretty important
legal conclusion. And finally the answer may constitute a serious
admission against interest. Facts do not easily separate themselves from law or evidence. The code courts have spent alto.
gether too much time in attempting to extricate them from their
surroundings. The way out is to require of the parties that they
state their versions of the case simply and directly and then stop.
If further details are desirable they can be brought out more
easily at the trial than by prolonging these preliminary proceedings. If, too, the rules provide a set of official forms available for the more common types of law suit, convenience and
celerity of action is insured. This is the admirable system which
your draftsmen are proposing.
Again they are accepting the liberal English rules of joinder
of parties and of causes. At common law, the system of forms of
action restricted joinder of causes, and the rules of substantive
law governed and limited joinder of parties to cases involving
joint rights or duties. Joinder as a purely procedural device to
lessen the number of law suits was not known. The code system
marked some advance from this position, but unfortunately the
code makers framed their provisions largely in the light of the
old tradition. They permitted joinder of causes only within
certain specified classes, constructed without logical consistency
as to each other and apparently as a result of a curious combination of the ancient common law and the more modern equity
principles. As to parties they adopted the equity rule to apply
to all actions. But they made an unfortunate mistake in their
expression of the rule. At that time current theory called for
the statement of all law in the form of a rigid statute or code.
So a code of practice must be couched in arbitrary statutory form,
with nothing left to the discretion of the court. One can hardly
think of a more unsuitable method of stating a merely procedural
rule, governing process and not product. Nevertheless they attempted such a formulation of the rule. They made "interest
in the subject of the action" and "interest in the relief" the
tests of joinder. At least these should have been stated as alternative, not cumulative requirements. But the statute as enacted
contained the word "and" instead of "or", and the result was
seriously to limit party joinder in all actions calling for legal relief. The modern English practice now permits joinder in cases
where a common question of law or fact is involved, the trial
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judge having discretion to order separate trials. These provisions
have been made the rule in New Jersey, in New York, and by recent enactment in California. They form the basis of the first of
the two forms of section seven as recommended in your Report.
Of these two forms, the first is unquestionably preferable. Here
joinder of causes and of parties are properly treated together.
One result of the hybrid reform of the New York Civil Practice
Act was an attempted combination of the English provisions for
joinder of parties with the old code rules for joinder of causes.
The New York courts have construed these provisions in such a
way that the widely heralded reform of the rules of party joinder
has been largely wiped out by the old code restriction on joinder
of causes. The first form of section seven here suggested avoids
this danger.
One additional provision I hope to see adopted in this state in
time is the use of the motion procedure in equity cases also. If
the practice can be employed in both law and equity actions interchangeably, if legal and equitable claims can be joined and legal
and equitable defenses filed, you will have achieved by simple
means a true union of law and equity. No procedure can be considered simplified if two separate systems owing their origin to
historical conditions and no longer necessary, are still required
for the redress of essentially similar reforms.
The final recommendation, one of the most important of the entire report, is for the establishment of a bureau of statistics.
Jurists and scholars are only now coming to realize our lack of
knowledge of what the courts are actually doing due to the dearth
of reliable judicial statistics. Almost no such figures are available in this country as compared to the detailed reports in other
countries, particularly Scotland and Germany, and to a somewhat lesser extent, England and her colonies. Bookkeeping and
adequate accounting systems are a necessity of modern business.
The question is being asked how long courts can afford to do
without such systems. Thus the Pennsylvania Crime Commission
said this year "No private enterprise could long emst without
providing adequate means of determining the relation between its
machinery and its product. Is it not, therefore, fair to assume
that this huge public machine called the administration of justice
could be made more effective by the installation of some system
which would determine the effectiveness of its operation?" And
Chief Justice Taft said in 1926:
"No single agency to induce Congress and State Legislatures
to the enactment of measures to improve the administration of
the criminal law could be more effective than the practical truth
in respect to the condition of the courts in the prosecution of
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crime, and nothing would more stimulate a demand for greater
speed in the disposition of the civil cases in behalf of the litigating public than the truth as to the delays and congestion in
the civil docket."
Crime Commissions and Judicial Councils generally are voicing
the same views. Your Report recommends what would be the
first official state bureau for the gathering of judicial statistics.
We at Yale are particularly interested in this development in
-WestVirginia. Two years ago we began a statistical investigation of the trial courts of Connecticut. Last year the work was
extended also to Massachusetts and New York. Under a grant
from one of the Foundations it will continue for at least four
years more. So valuable have the results seemed to us that we
have been anxious to see the extension of the investigation to
other places. Dean Arnold and his faculty have been particularly interested in the project. We have completed joint plans with
them to develop the work here. I think Dean Arnold with his
force and vigor and with some assistance which we can offer him,
will manage to make a beginning at least, even without state
help. But an official state bureau is most desirable. After all
this is a function of the state and should be so maintained and
financed. Moreover the gathering of the statistics is made comparatively easy if the state officials are required by law to file the
records on uniform forms with a central office. And lastly the
official character of the records is valuable as a badge of their authenticity and accuracy. All those interested in statistical method
as applied to law will watch with interest the result of this plan
for your state.
Our work at Yale has been hampered by being a private venture. We have had to send our investigators into the offices of
the various clerks of courts, there laboriously to dig out the statistics from the files of the completed cases. But the unique value
of the data thus collected seems apparent to all. It is of especial
interest to the lawyer and judge in predicting future court action,
to the reform organization in showing the places where improvement is needed and to the student of law and social institutions
in supplying a rich store of materials dealing with the social life
of the community.
I wish time was available so that I might tell you in some detail of this work. But I must content myself with a few of the
facts we have discovered and refer you generally to our reports.
Some of those facts are perhaps obvious but I doubt if they have
been thought of. Thus how many of you have considered the
odds of success in the ordinary law suit? They favor the plaintiff to a truly surprising extent. In a small claims court, his
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odds are twenty to one; in the general courts they are ten to
one. In contested cases they are naturally reduced but are still
high-three to one in all such cases and four to one or greater in
the contract and debt cases. Thus a trial judge may know as a
case comes before him that the chances of a plaintiff's judgment
are three to one or greater. In the light of these figures perhaps
our rules of burden of proof and of presumptions should be materially revised.
Again trial lawyers generally cherish the notion that juries are
notoriously favorable to plaintiffs. Actually there are many more
verdicts than court judgments for defendants. With the possibilities of a disagreement or reversal included, a defendant has almost a fifty-fifty chance, while before the court he wins in only
23% of the contested cases. These figures are in a jurisdiction
where jury trial is frequently waived, and possibly mean no more
than the jury habitually gets the weak or desperate case.
Judicial statistics are invaluable in showing the places where
improvement is needed. Your practice may be as generally effective as this Report indicates and yet by very lack of formality
lend itself to abuse as our Connecticut violation of the rule for
filing answers shows. In this connection we discovered some
rather startling figures on the administration of criminal justice.
In one of our largest counties jury trial had practically disappeared; it was limited to two cases a year. Our law permits of
waiver of jury trial by the accused. But there were very few
court trials. Actually the public prosecutor was disposing of the
bulk of the business by obtaining pleas of guilty or recommending nolles. The latter were especially frequent in the cases of the
lesser offenses. Thus izolles were entered in 90% of the appeals
from police court convictions for reckless driving of motor vehicles. Either police courts or appeal courts must be grievously
at fault for such results to obtain.
The figures also indicate the large amount of automatic and essentially ministerial actions performed by the courts. In our
court the largest number of cases are divorce actions and these,
especially where uncontested, result in judgments for the plaintiff.
Foreclosures follow next in number and with similar results. The
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has thought
this unnecessary and has adopted a uniform mortgage act where
court foreclosure is not required. Such a system already obtains
in Massachusetts and our researches there indicate little dissatisfaction for bills to redeem or prevent foreclosure are so infrequent as to be negligible. Our court machinery now lacks
sorting devices which would place the similar cases together and
provide for a short and simple, and where possible, an automatic
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or semi-automatic disposition of them. Possibilities of this kind
are indicated by the Workmen's -Compensation tribunals and the
small claims courts.
Working along this line is a suggested plan for a compensation
act as a solution for the automobile accident cases now clogging
our courts. A committee of judges, lawyers and law teachers is
now investigating the problem under a grant from one of the
Foundations and we have assisted in the collection of the judicial
statistics. This work, too, is about to be extended to West Virginia, and Dean Arnold and his colleagues will have a part in it.
The value of accurate statistical information for such study is
clear.
Other uses of such judicial statistics to the student of the law
and of society are becoming more and more apparent. Perhaps
our case books for law study will require revision in the light of
the knowledge thus gained. Thus why should we spend time in
instructing the student in all the details of slander and libelcolloquium, innuendo, inducement and so on-when such cases
comprise considerably less than one-half of one per cent of all
cases tried? Students of crime, of divorce, of family law and of
commercial and business law all may here find important and
realistic data of actual court activities. Some few years of delving in this material may produce results startling perhaps in confirmation or disaffirmation of cherished ideas.
These then are some of the vistas opened before you by this
Report. I hope I have been able to bring to you the alluring
prospects of pleasure to yourselves and of service to the state
contained in this program. If I have helped in this way, and if
I have not wearied you past all endurance, perhaps I may look
forward to visiting you again at some future time when the
promise now so apparent of your activity in the cause of legal
reform shall have been redeemed by wholly adequate performance.
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